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et al.: Home Rule

HOME RULE
N.Y CONST. art. X, § 2(c):
In addition to powers granted in the statute of local
governments or in any other law, (i) every local government shall
have power to adopt and amend local knvs not inconsistent with
the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to
its property, affairs or government and, (ii) every local
government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not
inconsistentwith the provisions of this constitution or any general
law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate
to the property, affairs or government of such local
government ....
U.S. Const. art. VI:
This Constitution, and the Lavs of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

COURT OF APPEALS
Hertz v. City of New York 1227
(decided December 22, 1992)

Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to
invalidate and preclude enforcement of the "Hertz Law" 1228 on
the grounds that it violated the preemption doctrine of the New
1227. 80 N.Y.2d 565, 607 N.E.2d 784, 592 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1992), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1055 (1994).
1228. See N.Y. LOCAL LAw No. 71-A, § 20-697 (1992). This section, also
known as the "Hertz Law," provides that "'[n]o rental vehicle company shall
refuse to rent a motor vehicle to any person otherwise qualified based on that
person's residence, nor impose fees or charges based on that person's
residence.'" Id.

1023
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York State Constitution, 12 2 9 the Federal Constitution, 12 3 0 and the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 1231 Plaintiff further contended that state
law regulating the rental car industry preempted local law. 1232
The New York Court of Appeals, addressing only the state
constitutional issue, held that the "Hertz Law" was not
unconstitutional because there was no direct conflict between the
1229. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c). Section 2(c) states in relevant part:
In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or in
any other law, (i) every local government shall have power to adopt and
amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution
or any general law relating to its property, affairs or government and,
(ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local
laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any
general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate
to the property, affairs or government of such local government ....
Id.
1230. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Article VI states in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
1231. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992). Section 1 states in relevant
part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing
contained in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a
commodity.

of

the

others ....

. .

same

which is in free and open competition with commodities

general

class

produced

or

distributed

by

Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not

make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment
or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein
involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between
wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between
retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with
each other.
Id.
1232. Hertz, 80 N.Y.2d at 568, 607 N.E.2d at 785-86, 592 N.Y.S.2d at
638-39.
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state laws and the local ordinance. 12 33 Furthermore, the court
determined that it was not the intent of the state legislature either
to regulate the entire car rental industry or to preempt local
legislation in the area of rental car company practices. 1234
The plaintiff Hertz Corporation was engaged in the business of
renting vehicles to customers. 12 35 On January 2, 1992, the Hertz
Corporation proclaimed that it intended to increase its daily rental
rates charged in the New York area "by $56.00 for residents of
the Bronx, by $34.00 for residents of Queens." 1236 In response
to Hertz's announcement, the New York City Council enacted
Local Law 21 of 1992 (the "Hertz Law"), which prohibited
rental car companies from refusing to rent a vehicle to an
individual based on his or her residence, and furthermore
proscribed the imposition of a higher rental fee based on a
person's residence. 1237 Hertz then initiated an action against the
City of New York in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. 1238 The district court dismissed
the complaint, Hertz appealed, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the issue in
question would be more properly decided by the New York
Court of Appeals, since adjudication of the issue required
interpretation of state statutes and case law, and "directly
involve[d] the application of an important public policy of the
State of New York." 1239 Thus, the Second Circuit certified the
following question to the New York Court of Appeals:
"[W]hether New York State legislation addressing car rental
practices sets forth a sufficiently comprehensive scheme of
regulations to preempt further legislation in the field by

1233. Id. at 569, N.E.2d at 786, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 639.

1234. Id.
1235. Id. at 567, 607 N.E.2d at 785, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
1236.
1237.
1238.
1239.

Id.
Id. at 567-68, 607 N.E.2d at 785, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
See Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 57.
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municipalities of the state." 1240 The court of appeals answered
the question in the negative, concluding that it was not the intent
of the legislature to prohibit municipalities from regulating the
12 4 1
car rental industry.
In reaching its conclusion that no conflict existed between state
and local law, the court stated that it was a "well settled" rule of
law that a local ordinance may be held invalid when either a
direct conflict exists between it and state law, or when "the State
has clearly evinced a desire to preempt an entire field thereby
precluding any further local legislation." 1242 However, absent
1240. Id. The question was certified pursuant to § 500.17(b) of the New
York Rules of the Court. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 500.17 (1989). Section 500.17 states in relevant part:
Whenever it appears to the Supreme Court of the United States, any
United States Court of Appeals, or a court of last resort of any other
state, that determinative questions of New York law are involved in a
cause pending before it for which there is no controlling precedent of
the Court of Appeals, such court may certify the dispositive questions of
law to the Court of Appeals.
Id.
1241. Hertz, 80 N.Y.2d at 569, 607 N.E.2d at 786, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 639.

1242. Id. (quoting Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d 91,
96-97, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 524 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (1987)); see also New York
State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 217, 505 N.E.2d
915, 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (1987), aft'd, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). The New
York State Club Ass'n court stated that "[t]he constitutional home rule
provision... places two firm restrictions on [the use of broad police power by
local government]: (1) the local government may not exercise its police power
by adopting a local law inconsistent with constitutional or general law; and (2)
the City may not exercise its police power when the Legislature has restricted
such an exercise by pre-empting the area of regulation. Id.; People v. New
York Rock Trap Corp., 57 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1224, 456
N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (1982). The New York Rock Trap Corp. court stated that
"if a town or other local government is otherwise authorized to legislate, it is
not forbidden to do so unless the State, expressly or impliedly, has evinced an
unmistakable desire to avoid the possibility that the local legislation will not be
on all fours with that of the State." Id. But see People v. De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d
465, 469, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261, 446 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (1982). The De
Jesus court found the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, which was at issue, to
be pre-emptive because it established a system which is "both comprehensive
and detailed." Id. To support its conclusion, the court stressed such facts as:
the law gave the State Liquor Authority "the power to grant licenses under
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either a direct conflict or a clear intent by the legislature to
preempt further regulation by municipalities, a local law will be
deemed valid.1243 For example, in New York State Club
Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 1244 the Court of Appeals
held that Local Law 63,1245 designed to proscribe discrimination
against non-members in "disinctly private" clubs, was a valid
defined circumstances," the law "imposes its own direct controls at the local
level by creating local alcoholic beverage control boards," and the law
declared that the State's goal was the regulation and control of "'the
manufacture, sale and distribution within the state of alcoholic beverages for
the -purpose of fostering and promoting temperance.., and obedience to
law.'" Id. at 470, 430 N.E.2d at 1262, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 209. In other words,
the court found that the "State [had] made a studied decision that the problems
to which the statute was directed... would be more effectively met not at the
local community level but by State action alone." Id.
1243. See generally Jancyn, 71 N.Y.2d at 97-98, 518 N.E.2d at 906, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 10-11 (holding state statute prohibiting sale and use of sewage
system cleaning additives containing toxic chemicals did not pre-empt county
ordinance prohibiting sale of cesspool additives without county commissioner's
prior approval since the Legislature had not shown either express or implied
intent "to preclude the possibility of local regulation of sewage system
cleaners"); New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 219, 505 N.E.2d at 919,
513 N.Y.S.2d at 353 (finding that the State had not pre-empted the area of
anti-discrimination since "the State's failure to define the term 'distinctively
private'" suggests a Legislative intent to allow local governments to enact
pursuant to the municipal home rule power definitions that are not inconsistent
with the meaning of this broad term"); New York Rock Trap Corp., 57 N.Y.2d
at 377, 442 N.E.2d at 1224, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 714 (1982). The court found that
because section 10 of the Municipal Home Rule gave local governments
"broad authority to adopt ordinances governing the safety, health and wellbeing of those within their jurisdiction and.., subdivision 11 of section 130
of the Town Law, towns have received specific authority to regulate noise in
their communities ...[it is] the surest indication that the State has not
intended to restrict the regulation of noise to itself." Id.
1244. 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1987), af'd,
487 U.S. 1 (1988).
1245. N.Y. Crry LocAL LAw No. 63 (1984). The law provides that a club
[s]hall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it [1] has more
than four hundred members, [2] provides regular meal service, and [3]
regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities,
services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of
nonmembers for the furtherance of trade of business.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 43

1028

TOUR O LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

constitutional exercise of the city's police power, and did not
conflict with the "home rule" provision1 246 of the New York
State Constitution. 1247 In New York State Club Association, the
plaintiff, a consortium of one hundred twenty-five private clubs,
many of which were knowingly organized "along national origin,
religious, ethnic and gender lines," sought judgment proclaiming
Local Law 63 unconstitutional. 1248 In. holding the law
constitutional, the court reasoned that Local Law 63 was closely
intertwined with the "home rule" provision, and thus was not
inconsistent with it.1249 Nor was an inconsistency evident
1250
between Local Law 63 and the State Human Rights Law,
since the Human Rights Law contained no definition describing a
"distinctly private" club as did Local Law 63.1251 Therefore, the
court reasoned, Local Law 63 and its definition of "distinctly
private" clubs neither conflicted with that state statutory scheme
nor with a previous judicial determination of the factors which
1252
aid in delineating "distinctly private" clubs.

1246. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c).
1247. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 219, 505 N.E.2d at 919,
513 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
1248. Id. at 216, 505 N.E.2d at 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
1249. Id. at 218, 505 N.E.2d at 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
1250. See generally N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-96 (McKinney 1993).
1251. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 218-9, 505 N.E.2d at 91718, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
1252. Id. at 221, 505 N.E.2d at 919-20, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 353-54; see also
United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d
401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983). The Power Squadrons court
held that in determining whether a private club is in fact a place of public
accommodation in disguise, the following factors may be considered:
(1) whether the club has permanent machinery established to screen
applicants on any basis or no basis at all, (2) whether the club limits the
use of facilities and services to members and bona fide guests of
members, (3) whether the club is controlled by the membership, (4)
whether the club is non-profit and operated solely for the benefit and
pleasure of members, and (5) whether the club directs its publicity
exclusively to their membership for the purpose of information and
guidance.
Id. at 412-13, 452 N.E.2d at 1204, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
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Similarly, in Jancyn Manufacturing Corp. v. County of
Suffolk, 1253 the court of appeals held that a local ordinance,
which prohibited the sale of chemical cesspool additives without
prior approval by the Suffolk County Commissioner of the
Department of Health Services, 125 4 did not conflict with the
Environmental Control Law. 1255 The plaintiff had received
authorization to sell its chemical additives from the State
Commission of Environmental Services pursuant to article 39 of
the Environmental Control Law. 125 6 However, this authorization
was expressly contingent upon each county, in which the plaintiff
wished to sell its product, giving approval under its local
laws. 1257 Suffolk County prohibited the sale of the plaintiff's
product and the plaintiff brought suit seeking to have Local Law
12 invalidated. 125 8 In declaring that the local law was in accord
with state regulation, the Jancyn court held that municipal laws
will be deemed inconsistent, and therefore invalid, when the state
law, whether expressly or by implication, deems the conduct
unacceptable or when the local law imposes restrictions upon
rights granted by the state legislature, since in these situations the
state's valid exercise of its police power would be thwarted. 125 9
Because Local Law 12 did not fall within either category, the
court of appeals upheld its application. 1260
As to the claim that the legislature intended to preempt local
legislation in the rental car industry, the Hertz court held that no
1253. 71 N.Y.2d 91, 518 N.E.2d 903, 524 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1987).
1254. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAw § 39-0101 (McKinney 1984). Section

39-0101 states:
It is declared to be the public policy of this state to prevent the pollution
of water resources in restricted geographical areas through the use of
sewage system cleaners and additives by establishing a regulatory
program restricting the use of such products.

Id.
1255. Jancyn, 71 N.Y.2d at 94, 518 N.E.2d at 904, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 9; see
also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 39-0101 (McKinney 1984).

1256. Jancyn, 71 N.Y.2d at 94-95, 518 N.E.2d at 904, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
1257. Id. at 95, 518 N.E.2d at 904, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
1258. Id.
1259. Id. at 97, 518 N.E.2d at 905-06, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.
1260. Id. at 97-98, 518 N.E.2d at 906-07, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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such preemptive intent could be discerned from the applicable
General Business Laws. 126 1 These relevant provisions dealt with
prohibitions against taxes and mileage charges as a condition of
renting a vehicle, 1262 age discrimination, 1263 discrimination
against persons who did not own a credit card, 1264 and
discrimination on the basis of race, color,, national origin or
sex. 1265 None of these provisions, however, addressed the issue
of discrimination based on one's residence. 1266 Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the legislature's statutory scheme was neither
so broad in scope nor so detailed as to manifest an intent to
preempt local regulation of the rental car industry. 12 67
Additionally, the state's vehicle and traffic laws, while imposing
mandates on all owners of motor vehicles, 126 8 did not address the
1261. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, §§ 396-z, 391-g, 391-i, 398-b (McKinney
1993).
1262. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-z (10)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
Section 396-z(10)(a) states: "A rental vehicle company shall not charge in
addition to the rental rate, taxes and mileage charge, if any, any fee which
must be paid as a condition of renting the vehicle .... " Id.
1263. N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW § 391-g (1) (McKinney Supp. 1993). Section
391-g (1) states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, partnership, association or
corporation engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles to refuse
to rent such vehicle to any person eighteen years of age or older solely
on the basis of age provided that insurance coverage for persons of such
age is available.
Id.
1264. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 391-i (2) (McKinney Supp. 1993). Section
391-i(2) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, partnership,
association or corporation engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles to
refuse to rent such vehicle to any person solely on the requirement of
ownership of a credit card." Id.
1265. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 398-b (McKinney Supp. 1993). Section 398-b
states: "No car or vehicle rental agency shall refuse to rent a car or vehicle to
any person otherwise qualified because of race, color, ethnic origin or sex."
Id.
1266. Hertz, 80 N.Y.2d at 569, 607 N.E.2d at 786, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
1267. Id.; see also Albany Builders v. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 371, 377,
546 N.E.2d 920, 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1989) ("[A] comprehensive,
detailed statutory scheme ... may evidence an intent to pre-empt . .

").

1268. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1993) (addressing periodic inspection of motor vehicles); N.Y. VEi. & TRAF.
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issue at bar. 1269 Thus, within the realm of rental car company
practices, local legislation will be deemed constitutionally
permissible so long as the local law in question neither conflicts
with state laws nor is preempted by the legislature's statutory
scheme.
Like article IX, section 2 of the New York Constitution, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates the
federal preemption of conflicting state laws. Similar to its New
York counterpart, federal congressional intent to supersede in a
particular area may be expressly stated by statutory language,
may be inferred from the pervasive regulatory scheme adopted by
Congress, or may be found to the extent that an actual conflict
exists between state and federal law. 1270

In a recent Supreme Court case dealing with state regulations,
CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Eastenvood,127 1 respondent widow
LAw § 383 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993) (safety belts and anchorage
assemblies); N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 390 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993)
(inspection of motor vehicles and motorcycles); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWv
§ 1229-c (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993) (operation of vehicles with safety
seats and safety belts, respectively); see N.Y. INS. LAW § 2131 (McKinney
Supp. 1993). This section states in relevant part:
The superintendent may issue to a rental vehicle company ... which
has complied with the requirements of this section, a limited license
authorizing the licensee, known as a 'limited licensee' for the purpose of
this article, to act as agent, with reference to the kinds of insurance
specified in this section, of any insurer authorized to write such kinds of
insurance in this state.
Id. see also N.Y. TAX LAW § 1160 (McKinney Supp. 1993) Section 1160(a)(1)
states:
On and after June first, nineteen hundred ninety, in addition to any tax
imposed under any article of this chapter, there is hereby imposed and
there shall be paid a tax of five percent upon the receipts from every
rental of a passenger car which is the retail sale of such passenger car.
Id.
1269. Hertz, 80 N.Y.2d at 569-70, 607 N.E.2d at 786, 592 N.Y.S.2d at
639. The court also noted that laws imposing a tax on passenger rental cars did
not consider the issue before the court. Id.; see also N.Y. TAX LAW § 1160
(McKinney Supp. 1993).
1270. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481-82
(1991).
1271. 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993).
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of a truck driver killed by a train operated by petitioner when it
collided with the truck he was operating, brought a wrongful
death action, claiming that, under Georgia law, CSX was
negligent for "failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the
1272
crossing and for operating the train at an excessive speed."
Petitioner, CSX Transportation, claimed that both of
respondent's claims were preempted by the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which was enacted "'to promote
safety in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroadrelated accidents, and to reduce deaths and injuries to
persons."' 1273 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
finding that "respondent's allegation of negligence based on the
train's speed was preempted, but that the claim based on the
74
absence of proper warning devices was not." 12
The Court agreed with the lower court in stating that to find
pre-emption of Georgia negligence law pertaining to grade
crossings, "petitioner must establish more than that they 'touch
upon' or 'relate to' the subject matter." 1275 The Court found no
pre-emption of this subject matter, since the federal regulations
only provided that States were to receive funds if they take
certain steps to ensure efficient spending of such funds, but had
12 7 6
"little to say about the subject matter of negligence law."
Furthermore, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that
the negligence claim based on the train speed was preempted.
Pursuant to FRSA, federal regulations were issued which set
"maximum allowable operating speeds" for all trains. Therefore,
the Court reasoned that "[u]nderstood in the context of the
overall structure of the regulations, the speed limits must be read
as not establishing a ceiling, but also precluding additional state
regulation of sort which respondent seeks to impose on
petitioner." 12 7 7
1272. Id. at 1736.
1273. Id.

1274. Id.
1275. Id. at 1738.

1276. Id. at 1739.
1277. Id. at 1742.
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Therefore, the dictates of article IX, section 2(c) of the New

York State Constitution are parallel to that of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Walker v. Town of Hempstead 12 78
(decided June 1, 1993)

Plaintiff Walker claimed that defendant Town of Hempstead's
local "notice of defect" law1 2 7 9 was inconsistent with New York

State General Municipal Law section 50-e(4) 1280 and therefore
unconstitutional under the auspices of article IX section 2(c)(ii) of
the New York State Constitution. 1281 The court held that the
1278. 190 A.D.2d 364, 598 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1993).
1279. LOCAL LAws, 1988 No. 90 of Town of Hempstead. This law states in
pertinent part:
No civil action shall be maintained against the Town of
Hempstead... unless written notice of... the defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed condition of such parking field, beach area,
swimming or wading pool or pool equipment, playground or playground
equipment, skating rink or park property was actually served upon the
Town Clerk ....
Id.
1280. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(4) (McKinney 1986). Section 50-e
states in pertinent part:
No other or further notice... shall be required as a condition to the
commencement of an action... provided, however, that nothing herein
contained shall be deemed to dispense with the requirement of notice of
the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of any street,
highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk, or the existence of
snow or ice thereon.
Id.
1281. Walker, 190 A.D.2d at 368, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 552; see also N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii), which provides in pertinent part: "Every local
government shall have the power to adopt and amend local laws not
inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law....
Id.
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